Once the exclusive province of pundits and pollsters, the arena of election forecasting has been entered by political scientists in recent years (Rosenstone 1983; Rice 1985 Rice , 1986 
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retrospective voting model. This is reflected in the variables used in deriving the forecasts: the incumbent president's popularity (Sigelman 1979; Brody and Sigelman 1983 ; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; 15-16) , economic conditions prior to the election (Hibbs 1982; Fair 1978 Fair , 1982 Fair , 1988 Karmin 1987) (1984, 17) , following Tufte's (1978) lead, supplemented the May ratings of presidential popularity with the real gross national product (GNP) growth rate per capita in the second quarter of the election year. The updated estimate of this equation indicates that it is a substantial improvement over the equation based solely on presidential approval ratings. The popularity/economy equation accounts for about 70% of the variance in the presidential vote and has an average absolute error of 2.5 percentage points.
Recently, Abramowitz (1988) Rice (1982, 1984) . Equation 2 was first proposed by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984) . Equation 3 was developed by Abramowitz (1988 Commerce 1960 Commerce , 1964 Commerce , 1968 Commerce , 1988 (1948) . Surprisingly, the November lead was only slightly more accurate, a mean absolute error of 2.4 percentage points, and the November leader actually lost in two cases (1948 and 1976) . The trend in the mean absolute errors at the six trial-heat points are charted in Figure 1 (the &dquo;r&dquo; points). Trial-heats may be used to forecast the two-party vote more systematically through regression analysis. Figure 1 (the &dquo;b&dquo; points). As a comparison of the average errors demonstrates, the forecasts based on simple trial-heat regressions were consistently more accurate than those taken directly from the raw trial-heat Table 3 .11
The out-of-sample expected votes were nearly as accurate as those fitted within-sample. The mean absolute error was 1.1 percentage points, and in ten of the eleven elections, the error was less than 2 percentage points. Like the within-sample estimates, early-September out-of-sample estimates correctly &dquo;predicted&dquo; the winning candidate in every election except 1960. 264 These out-of-sample errors compared favorably to those of the Abramowitz equation in which the out-of-sample average absolute error was 1.9 percentage points. This difference was large enough to cause the Abramowitz equation to forecast wrongly the winner of four elections (1960, 1968, 1976, and 1988 (1948, 1972 However, the "out-of-sample" forecasts demonstrated that the improvements in actual forecasts generated by the regression equations was not greatly overstated.
5. Several other treatments of the simple trial-heat percentages were examined: (a) The trial-heat division was constrained to the historical range of the actual vote to adjust for the exaggeration of landslides; (b) "undecideds" and third-party respondents were divided equally between the major candidates rather than proportionally; and (c) a conditional or "threshold" trial-heat measure taking voter indecision into account was also considered. Only the landslide adjustment substantially improved the accuracy of the forecast, and even that was not an improvement over the regression-generated forecasts.
6. Presidential approval ratings in May (the reading used by Lewis-Beck and Rice) were also added to the trial-heat regression forecasts. However, the addition of the approval rating did not improve the fit of the equation. 7. As in the simple bivariate regressions shown in Table 2 , the trial-heat coefficients had values less than one at each point, but these strengthened through the course of the campaign.
8. The prospective third-term, "time for a change" variable from Abramowitz's model was also introduced into the trial-heat/economy equations. In each equation, the estimated coefficient of the second-term variable was negative, as Abramowitz's analysis indicated. It was also statistically significant in the June and late-July equations. However, in later equations, the prospective third-term coefficient was smaller (less than a 3-point penalty) and was not statistically significant. Presumably, most sentiment of "it's time for a change" associated with a party having served two consecutive terms is expressed through lower trial-heat ratings. In fact, the incumbent party seeking more than a second consecutive term did fare more poorly in the trial-heats. The correlations with the six trial-heats in the eleven elections examined ranged from -.63 to -.78.
9. It appears that the forecast was more dependent on the early-September trial-heat results than on the earlier growth rate of the economy. The standardized coefficient for the trial-heat variable was .74 and .46 for the second-quarter growth in GNP variable.
10. Like the OLS estimation, much of the LMS error was in the single case of the 1956 election and the "resistant diagnostic" LMS statistic indicates that this case was an outlier. The constant in the LMS regression was 25.42.
11. The residuals were inspected for evidence of partisan bias (Buchanan 1986 
